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The growth process spans over time, and studying it requires the analysis of time series
data. The time-series variability in the determinants of growth, however, is often insufficient for
sorting out the impact of the various effects. More variability in these variables exists between
countries, and for this reason some of the empirical growth analysis is based on cross-country
data.  Each of these two possibilities has its advantages and limitations, and it is therefore natural
to utilize both sources to compare the experience of a particular country with that of other
countries.  
The US is of a particular interest for a variety of reasons.  From the vantage of economic
development, and of historical perspective, it has made the transformation from an agricultural
based economy to nonagricultural economy in relatively short time.  “The first census of the United
States found that 95 percent of the population was rural, and it was not until 1830 that the urban
population exceeded 10 percent of the total.” (Johnson 1997, p.3).  With US  agriculture
accounting currently for about 2 percent of the labor force, the US accounts for about 14 percent of
world agricultural production, it has been a major player in international agricultural markets, it
has had elaborate agricultural programs, and has maintained high level of productivity in
agriculture and in the economy.  In addition, it had been written on extensively, and above all, it
has data covering a the complete period of the transformation, which is essential for the task. 
To capture the picture of the main forces at work, we can organize the discussion of the
experience of US agriculture around four periods: 1800-1840, 1840-1900, 1900-1940, and 1940
to date.  For some purposes these periods can be subdivided, where 1880, 1920, and 1980 serve
as useful reference years.  The nineteenth century was a decade of high growth rate in the economy
and in agriculture; the growth rate of agricultural output exceeded that of the twentieth century, but
was  lower than that of nonagriculture.  Initially, the growth in agriculture was largely resource
based, where land, capital, and labor grew at similar rates, but around the middle2
 of the century growth rate of labor began to lag behind.  The gradual mechanization in agriculture
increased average labor productivity, and served as the main source of productivity growth.  This
pattern continued into the twentieth century, but with a changing pace.  Labor growth continued to
decline and early in the century the total agricultural labor started to decline.  From the late 1930s,
the implementation of biological and chemical intensive practices, or techniques, was intensified
and yields started to increase substantially.
When we talk about agriculture as a sector we implicitly deal with a dual, or a two-sector,
economy.  For some reasons, one gets the impression that discussions of the dual economy are 
associated mainly with countries where agriculture, or the rural sector, is still dominating.  Such
an association is unjustified because if the model is geared to deal with sectors of unequal relative
size, its pertinence should not depend on which sector is dominating.  The power of the model is
rooted in the decisions made on the margins, and those determine the trade between the sectors in
resources and in products.  It is the exchange and the behavior of the product and factor markets
which are crucial for the development process.  Those, naturally, change across countries and over
time, and it is this variability that makes the analysis interesting and useful.  What varies across
samples is the economic environment which consists of all the elements that determine the
economic decisions.  To extend this line of thinking, the same applies to the implementation of
technology.  To sum up, the study of development covers the dynamics of resource allocation and
technical change, and these elements play a center role in this paper.  The paper is based largely
on discussions and evidence reported in the literature that help us to identify and interpret the
processes associated with agricultural growth, along the lines spelled out in Mundlak (2000).
To place the US development in global perspective, we are restricted with data
availability, and there is a tradeoff  between the number of countries and the period of analysis. 
Our discussion  relies on the database used by Mundlak, Larson, Crego, and Butzer in the
references that appear below, and this consists of mostly data for the years 1967-1992. The
comparison is, therefore,  related to the more active period of US agriculture in terms of land
productivity.  This period is most pertinent for near future development of world agriculture.  To
facilitate the comparison, we mark the US in the presentation of the country distributions.  
For the experience of the US agriculture in the whole stretch of the twentieth century, we
rely on the recent book by Bruce Gardner (Gardner, 2002).  The evidence on the experience in the
nineteenth century is more eclectic.  Because the data for that century is sparse and of lower
quality, we deal separately with the two centuries.  
We begin with an overview the developments and a summary of the evidence used in the
discussion. It should come as no surprise that technical change has been the main force that moved
agriculture, in the US and elsewhere.  In spite of its importance, there is no consensus on its nature3
2Based on Gardner Figure 8.1.
3 Throughout, the term ‘rate of change’ or ‘growth rate’ imply the annual compounded average rate of change.
4 The number of countries was dictated by the available information, and it is therefore not the same in all the
figures presented in this paper.  In addition to differences among sources in time coverage, variables may
differ also in their definitions even though they may carry the same names. An important difference is the way
the variables are converted from nominal to real terms.  For instance, in the country study, output and prices
are measured by Fischer index, which is not the case in the variables presented by Gardner.  The purpose of
this note is to indicate a source for differences, and not to judge the quality of the series.
and impact.  We therefore devote much of the paper to gain an insight into the role played by
technology.  The growth in productivity is discussed within the framework of heterogeneous
technology.  This framework links productivity changes to resource flow.  Available data and
studies make it possible to discuss the problems encountered in inferring on the form of technical
change from production data.  Specifically, it leads us to question the validity of the familiar
paradigm of induced innovation, and its relevance to the explanation of agricultural development.  
The paper is bifocal in its coverage, and in addition to the general issues related to
dynamic aspects of resource allocation, productivity, and growth, it covers the dynamic aspects of
agricultural growth and their implications.  The general picture, common to the US and to trends in
world agriculture, is that over the last century world agricultural production grew faster than
demand. As a result, real world prices of agricultural products declined roughly by a factor of 2. 
The output growth was triggered largely by new technology, which in part was labor saving. This,
together with the development of nonagriculture, resulted in off-farm occupational migration of
labor. The decline in food prices improved consumers’ welfare, and the labor mobility to
nonagriculture contributed to overall economic development.  The off-farm migration was a major
factor in the alleviation of rural poverty.  The pace of change varied considerably across
countries, and it is for this reason that the country experience is of interest.  The paper is
concluded with a summary of the welfare implications of the agricultural growth, and with some
general methodological comments.
Production
Output:  An index of US real agricultural output was 24 in 1900, 36 in 1940, and 94 in 1990.2  The
implied average growth rates are 1 percent for the period 1900-1940, and 1.94 percent for the
period 1940 to 1990.3   The change in the pace of growth in US agriculture started around 1940. 
To bring in the global experience, we turn to Figure 1, which presents two distributions of growth
rates of agricultural output, based on a Fischer output index, of 130 countries for the period 1967-
1992.4  The uniform distribution assigns equal weight to each country, and its median is 1.94
percent.  In the weighted distribution countries are weighted by their value output, and the median
of this distribution is 2.25.  The US value for this period is 1.4 percent, which is very similar to
the value implied by Gardner (Figure 8.1)  Thus, in this period, the growth rate in the US was
lower than the median, and in fact 70 percent of the countries realized higher rates than that of the
US in that period. 
The lower growth rate in the US may reflect demand conditions.  Figure 2 presents the
distribution of per capita growth rates for the period 1967-92 for 130 countries.  The median of the
uniform distribution is nearly zero.  The median of the weighted distribution, however, is 0.7
percent, and 81 percent of world production was produced in countries with positive growth rates
in per capita production.  The difference between the two distributions indicates that the bigger
producers realized higher growth rates.  The rate in the U.S. is 0.4 percent, which is more than the
growth in per capita demand.
The faster growth in supply in th US was directed in part to markets abroad, and in part
caused a decline in prices.  The index of real prices received by US farmers (1992=100), was 192
in 1900, 150 in 1940, and 75 in 2000 (Gardner 2002, Figure 5.1).  The implied rates of change are
–0.6 percent for the period 1900-1940, –1.4 percent for the period 1940-90, and –1.5 percent for
the period 1967-92.  As to the global picture, Figure 3 presents the distribution of the rates of
change of the real agricultural prices, derived from Fischer index, for 112 countries for the period
1967-92.  The median of the uniform distribution is –0.45 and that of the weighted distribution is -
0.6.  Interestingly, 71 percent of world production was produced in countries where the real
agricultural price was declining.  In this series the rate for the US is –2.1.  Thus, in that period the
US experienced a stronger price decline than most other countries.
Land: The US land in farms, in million acres, was 300 in 1850, 839 in 1900, 1061 in 1940, 1159
in 1950 which was nearly the peak year, and 930 in 1990 (Tostlebe 1957, Table 6, and Gardner
Figure 1.1).  This implies average growth rates of 2.06 percent between 1850 and 1900, 0.59
percent between 1900 and 1940, and –0.44 percent between 1940 and 1990.  Land expansion had
been a major force in the nineteenth century, and was still an important factor of growth in the first
half of the twentieth century; this role was, however, reversed in the second half.  In spite of these
changes, the cropland was fairly stable, and stood around 300 million acres throughout the whole
century (Gardner 2002 Figure 3.2).  It showed a growth rate of 0.2 percent during 1900-1940, and
little change thereafter, so that the level in 1990 was similar to that in 1940.
The world experience is summarized in terms of agricultural area in accordance with the
FAO classification, which includes arable and permanent cropland and permanent pastures, and is
different from the US definition of farm land.  The median growth rate of 131 countries during5
5 Data up to 1950 come from Tostlebe (1957, table 4), for later years we use figures based on census data
reported by Barkley (1990) for the period 1940-85.  The extension to 1990 is based on growth rates derived
from Gardner (Figures 8.1 and 8.2).  Mundlak, Larson, and Crego (1998) use ILO data, which differ somewhat
from the census data for the US.
6Reproducible capital in agriculture is total agricultural capital less land value; based on Tostlebe (1957, Table 9).
1967-1992 was 0.4 percent, and the average growth rate for the world was 0.58 percent.  Thus,
unlike in the US, land has still played a role in the growth of world agriculture.
Labor:     The US agricultural labor force was approximately 11 millions in 1900, it reached a
peak of 11.6 millions in 1910, or thereabout, and declined to nearly 3 millions in 1990.5  The rate
of decline was about 0.42 percent for the period 1900-1940, and 2.14 percent for the period 1940-
1990.  The median growth rate of the uniform distribution of 148 countries for the period 1950-
1990 is 0.56 percent.  It thus appears that the US has been ahead of most countries in the decline of
the agricultural labor force. 
Fertilizers:  The US use of fertilizers, in million tons, was approximately 3.5 in 1900, 6.2 in 1910,
10 in 1940, and around 50 in 1990 (Gardner 2002, Figure 2.6a).  The implied average growth
rates are 2.7 percent for the period 1900-1940, and 3.3 for the period 1940-1990.  The changes in
fertilizers use reflect changes in cultivated area and in the intensity of application.  The difference
in growth rates of fertilizers and those of farmland gives the growth rates in intensity: 2 and 3.6
percent for the pre and post 1940 periods respectively.  A similar growth pattern took place in the
use of pesticides.  Gardner attributes the growth in fertilizers use to changes in crops and the
decline in real fertilizers prices.  These two factors were pervasive, and so was the increase in
fertilizers use.  For a comparison, the average growth rate for a sample of 37 countries for the
period 1970-90 was 3.04 percent (Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer 1999, Table 2).  
Capital:  The value of reproducible capital, in billions of 1910-1914 prices, increased from 12.3
in 1900 to 17.9 in 1920, and then declined to 15.4 in 1940.6  A turn about came shortly thereafter,
leading to a level of 19.2 in 1950.  The rate of growth for the period 1900-1940 is 0.55 percent,
very close to the rate of growth of land, indicating a stable capital-land ratio in that period.  
In the subsequent period investment was positive from 1943 until 1980,  but turned
negative thereafter, (Gardner 2002, Figure 8.3)   The capital stock, based on this investment series,
declined between 1930 and mid 1940s, and rose from there on reaching a peak in 1980, (Op. cit, 6
7 The interpolation of the BEA series reported in Gardner (2002, Figure 8.4) in 1982-1984 dollars series is: 44 in
1940, 188 in 1980, and 128 in 1990.  The rate of growth of the stock was 3.4 percent in the period 1943-1980. 
After that the stock declined at a rate of 3.7 percent. 
8  The series of fixed capital may not be identical with that of reproducible capital, but the rates of growth are
likely to be sufficiently close for our needs.
9“Between the outset of the war and 1920, the price of corn nearly doubled. ... The peak came in 1920.  Within two
years, corn prices had dropped more than 50 percent. (Clarke 1994, pp.106, 107).
Figure 8.4).7  The rate of growth for the period 1940-1990 is 2.17 percent.
Turning to the global picture, the median growth rate for the stock of fixed capital in
agriculture in the period 1967-92 is 2.1 percent (Mundlak 2000, Table 10.3).  The US value in this
series is 0.23 percent, reflecting the decline from 1980.  This value is consistent with Gardner
(Op. cit, Figure 8.4) which shows the same level for the capital stock in 1992 and 1967.  It thus
appears that in that period the capital stock in US agriculture grew far less than in other countries.8
The US figures do not reveal the dramatic change, which was taking place in US
agriculture, in the composition of the capital stock from around 1920, with the draft power
changing from animals to tractors.   The decline in draft animals, measured in billion 1910-1914
dollars, from 2.86 in 1920 to 1.64 in 1940, accounts for a large part of the decline in capital in that
period.  The number of tractors was practically zero in 1910, and rose to about 4.8 million in
1965.  About one half of this growth took place between 1920 and 1945 (Op. cit,  Figure 2.2). 
Setting the level in 1920 at 0.35 million and in 1945 at  2.3 million, yields a growth rate of 7.8
percent.  Later on the growth rate declined; it was 3.7 percent between 1945 and 1965, the peak
year for the number of tractors.  It is possible that the increase in the number of tractors was valued
less than the displaced draft animals.  This would be an indication of the technical change
bestowed on agriculture. 
Aside from the change in technology, the variability in investment was influenced by the
changes in the terms of trade of agriculture.  Demand expansion during World War I brought the
real prices received by farmers to a level of 317 in 1917, about 58 percent above their level in
1900.9  This generated a boom in land prices, but this boom did not last long, and prices soon
began to deteriorate, declining from 1917 to 1940 by a factor of 2 , and then again by the same
factor between 1973 and 2000, (Op. cit, Figure 5.1).  This fall in prices was followed by a fall in
farm income and liquidity, and a collapse in the price of farm land. Figure 4 presents the land
prices in the US, Canada, Japan, and South Africa for a long time period (Mundlak, Larson, and
Crego, 1998).  The top panel shows the price of land deflated by the agricultural GDP deflator, as
such, the price is expressed in terms of the agricultural product, say cereals.  The lower panel7
presents the land price deflated by the consumer price index, and as such it is expressed in terms
of the consumption good.  We discuss the differences between the two panels when we discuss the
welfare consequences at the end of the paper.  The two panels show a somewhat different pattern,
but in both cases we see the decline in land prices from the post World War I period to the 1940s. 
This drop in product and land prices caused a financial crisis, and that was not conducive for
investment.  This is reflected in the investment figures.
 Partial productivity measures
Table 1 presents the growth rates of the average productivities.  The growth rate of the
average land productivity in the U.S. was 0.41 and 2.38 percent for the periods 1900-40, and
1940-1990 respectively.  The crop output per acre shows no trend during 1910 to 1939, implying
no growth in yield in the first period.  The trend line from 1935 on shows a growth rate of 2.1
percent, but this was not all due to rise in yields; there was an expansion in double cropping,
which changed from 3.1 million acres in 1969 to 12.5 in 1982, mainly due to soybeans, (Gardner
2002, Figure 2.5). 
The growth rate of the average labor productivity in the US was 1.42 and 4.08 percent in
the two periods respectively.  The difference between the growth rates of the labor and land
productivity reflects the decline in the labor-land ratio, at the rate of 1.01 and 1.7 percent in the
two periods respectively.  This reflects the impact of the mechanization of agriculture, which was
gaining steam with time.
Turning to the global picture, Figure 5 presents the weighted distributions of the growth
rates of the two partial productivity measures for 87 countries for the period 1960-1992.  The
medians are 2.6 percent and 1.84 percent for the average labor productivity and land productivity
respectively.  The corresponding rates for the US in this sample are 2.96 percent and 1.46 percent
respectively.  Thus this series indicates that the US performance was above the median of the
labor productivity rate and below that of the of the land productivity rate.  The faster rise of the
labor productivity in the US reflects the faster decline of the agricultural labor force discussed
below.  The slower rise of the land productivity in the US reflects the lower growth rate in output. 
In contrast to the rise in the average productivity of labor and land in the US, the average
productivity of fertilizers declined considerably throughout.  The rate of change of this measure
was –1.66 and –1.33 for the two periods respectively.  This highlights the fact that fertilizers
consumption grew faster than output.  To interpret this result we should note that with constant
technology, the decline in the average productivity of fertilizers in response to an increase in the
intensity of application is consistent with a concave production function.  With constant
technology, a growth in the fertilizers-output  ratio can be caused by a decline in the real fertilizers8
price, or in its shadow price if initially the supply was limited.  Indeed, there was a dramatic
decline in the real price of fertilizers.  Binswanger (1978, Table 7-1) presents an index of the
price of fertilizers relative to the price of the aggregate input for the period 1912-1968.  From
these data it appears that this price ratio declined at the average annual rate of 1.9 percent and 5.1
percent in the periods 1912-1940, and 1940-1968 respectively.  The concavity of the function does
not, however, explain the fast growth in the fertilizers-output ratio over a very long time period. 
This can only be accounted for by a fertilizers-intensive change of the implemented technology, as
explained below.
The growth rate of the average capital productivity was 0.45 and -0.23 for the two periods
respectively.  The negative value of the second period indicates capital deepening in this period. 
Following the discussion on fertilizers, the negative value reflects capital intensive technical
change and possibly declining real prices of capital.  
Total factor productivity
The changes in the average productivity are sometimes taken as indicators of the changes in
technology, and even of innovations.  In order to see the limitation of this indicator, we digress on
some basics.  Consider the production function: 
Y = F(IKK, ILL),  (1)
Label VK = IKK and VL = ILL;  as such, they represent land and labor measured in terms of
efficiency units, respectively.  IK and IL are the augmenting functions; in general they are
considered as functions of time, but more profoundly they should be considered as functions of
variables representing the economic environment.  F(.) is a constant returns to scale, and twice
differentiable function in VK and VL.  Let $ be the production elasticity of labor, differentiate and
rearrange the terms to obtain:
(2)

























Under constant production elasticities, the rate of change of the average productivity of land is the
sum of two effects: factor intensity and technical change.  As a matter of definition, this9
10This statement is attributed to Griliches (1968).
formulation does not support the assertion that “In agriculture it appears consistent with technical
conditions of production to consider growth in land area per worker and output per hectare as
somewhat independent, at least over a certain range.” (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, p.171)10. 
Furthermore, the technical change component is a weighted average of the rates of change of the
two factor-augmenting components, and it does not identify their individual contribution. 
Specifically, a rise in the average land productivity is not a sufficient statistics for concluding that
the technical change is  land augmenting.  By implication, narratives based on that assumption are
misleading.  To explain changes in average productivity, we have to explain not only the changes
in technology but also the changes in factors intensity.  In fact, much of the work on productivity
deals with the decomposition of the output growth to its factor and technology components.  The
two components are not, however, independent as the above citation indicates.  Also, to anticipate
the discussion below, the above quotation is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the technical
change is induced by factor ratios, which is the essence of the induced innovation hypothesis.  We
return to this  topic in the discussion of heterogeneous technology. 
The calculation of changes in the total factor productivity is essentially an estimate of the
aggregate technology component in equation (2), and therefore does not provide information on the
values of the factor augmenting functions individually.  The identification of the augmenting
functions is of interest, but requires a different approach, as discussed below. 
By inspection of the rates of inputs growth in Table 1, it is clear that the calculation of the
change in the aggregate factor, referred to as total factor (TF), is sensitive to the weights assigned
to the various inputs in the aggregation.  There are two basic practices in the choice of weights,
constant weights and varying weights.  In practice, weights derived from empirical production
functions are mostly constant for the whole sample, whereas varying weights are mostly factor
shares, or based on factor shares.  The factor shares can be thought of as proxies for the production
elasticities.
There are various estimates of the growth of the TFP in the US.  Their differences reflect
differences in  period coverage, definition of inputs, quality adjustments, and in the choice of
weights.  We dwell shortly on the choice of weights.  For illustration, we take as a point of
reference the estimates suggested by Gardner for the TFP growth rate:  0.4 percent in 1910-1939,
and 2.0 percent in 1940-1996  (Op. cit pp. 45-6).  These are incidentally very similar to the growth
rate of the average land productivity (Table 1).  We have no definitive weights to suggest, but it is
instructive to examine what weights would reproduce these numbers.  Table 2 presents results10
11The group is an aggregate of  “[e]xpenidtures on tools, fuels, machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, and other
purchased inputs.” (Op. cit p. 62)
using two alternative sets of arbitrary weights that do the task.  Note that a single set will not work
well for the two periods in question.  Of course, the weights are not unique, but at the same time
there is little scope for big deviations.  If we had to provide the inspiration for these values,
beside the claim that they perform the task, we would start with land.  The cropsharing
arrangements provide the landlord one half of the crop, so a value of 0.5 for the share of land is a
good starting point.  This number should be adjusted downward for a two reasons.  First, under
cropsharing the landlord has responsibilities some of which are capital inputs.  Second,
cropsharing arrangement does not cover livestock which constitutes a major component of output. 
We thus settle on 0.3.  The distribution of weights between land and capital does not affect the
results in the first period because they both grew at similar rates.  We choose 0.25 for the two
periods, even though the growth rates of land and capital diverged in the second period. 
Fertilizers in our case represents other chemicals, primarily insecticides, and perhaps other
purchased inputs. We try 0.1 and 0.15.  The logic for 0.1 is that it seems to be a reasonable value
for the share of output used for chemicals.  However, observing the fast growth of fertilizers use
from the early years when the level was very low, it seems that the production elasticity of
fertilizers was initially high, reflecting a relatively high shadow price.  In the earlier years, also
the real fertilizers price was relatively high.  The low level of application may indicate that the
shadow price was even higher than the market price.  A postulated scenario, subject to empirical
verification, is that two changes took place with time, the price declined and the assumed gap
between the shadow price and market price was narrowed, or perhaps disappeared. The chosen
weight for fertilizers is consistent with the evidence on the share of expenditures on manufacturing
inputs in total production (Gardner 2002, Fig 3.5).11  The growth of this share was faster in the
first half of the century, from 5 to 12 percent.  Thereafter, the share fluctuated between 12 to 16
percent.  Some empirical studies show larger values for the elasticity of fertilizers, but this is
attributed to statistical bias, (Mundlak 2001).  The weights for labor are 0.3 and 0.35.  These
might seem low, compared to other studies.  Our choice reflects an assumption that labor force
data exaggerate the labor input in agriculture.  This seems to be a common problem in developing
economies.  Referring to Table 2, we see that the weights w1 result in TFP growth of 0.41 in the
period 1900-1940, and the weights w2 result in growth rate of 1.95 in 1940-1990.  The difference
between the two groups of weights is in the shares of labor and fertilizers.
The weights may not appear ‘reasonable’ to the reader, but this seems to be the cost of
getting a sensible approximation to the reported estimates of the TFP.  Gardner alludes to weights11






























derived from empirical production functions, but his estimates of the TFP are based on Ball et al
(1997), which use varying weights, similar in concept to factor shares. 
Two important messages come out of this discussion.  The substantive one is related to the
strong productivity growth in the second period, compared to the first one.  This result reflects the
assigned weights and the changes in the inputs that occurred in the two periods.  Land expanded in
the first period, and  declined in the second period;   The strongest rate of input decline is in labor
in the second period.  This suggests that the new technology was labor saving and capital using.  If
we were to increase the share of TF in the second period, it would be necessary to attribute larger
weights to fertilizers and capital and to decrease the weights of labor and land, which does not
seem attractive.  
The other message is related to the change in weights.  This can be expressed by extending
the differential in (2) to allow for a change in the elasticity:
This expression generalizes to more than two factors.  In this spirit, our foregoing discussion of the
decline in the average productivity of fertilizers is consistent with the decline in the production
elasticity of fertilizers.  The reason for the time changes in the parameters of the production
function is discussed in the next section within the framework of heterogenous technology.
Heterogeneous technology
The reader who is accustomed to the notion that there is a unique production function may
be suspicious of the practice of changing the weights in order to obtain desirable results.  The
problem with such a view is that the basic presumption of a unique production function is wrong. 
To explain this assertion, and to broaden the discussion below, we expand the framework to
account for the fact that the technology is heterogeneous in the sense that at any time there is more
than one technique that can be used in production.  In a world of heterogenous technology, there are
two pertinent concepts of technology, available technology and implemented technology.  The
available technology  represents the state of knowledge, whereas the implemented technology is
that part of the available technology  that is actually implemented.  By definition, the empirical 
work on productivity deals only with the implemented technology, because this is where the data
are generated.  What is not observed is not measured.12
12This framework should narrow down the scope of the assertion that theories of growth  “[f]ocus more on the
consequences of growth than on causes.  They incorporate investment and technological change, but do not analyze
the adoption of technology.”(Gardner 2002, p.255). 
13Without getting too technical, the weights in Ball et al are chosen so as to approximate a quadratic production
function.  Thus, the procedure assumes the existence of such a function.  Nevertheless, the use of changing weights
is an improvement.
To review briefly the essence of this framework, we note that at any point in time,
producers chose the implemented techniques given the economic environment.  This makes the
choice of the implemented technology an economic problem.  The choice is made jointly with the
decisions on the composition and level of outputs and inputs (Mundlak 1988, 2000 chapters 6, 13). 
This is the jointness property.  As Simon Kuznets (1957 p. xi) observed: “The point to be
stressed-and it is simply illustrated in Dr. Tostlebe’s discussion-is that physical capital assumes
meaning only within a given technological and institutional framework, and it follows that in a
progressive economy such as ours, this meaning changes all the time.  Thus, while there is a
continuous demand for capital replacement and addition, the magnitude needed are a function of an
ever changing and ever increasing stock of knowledge.”  
We refer to the determinants of the choice as state variables.  They consist of the available
technology, constraints, incentives, and institutional factors.  The state variables change over time
and also across countries, and consequently the coefficients of the empirical production function,
the levels of inputs and outputs change accordingly.  For this reason, strictly speaking, the
aggregate production function cannot be identified.  Empirical aggregate production functions are
approximations to a hypothetical function that is locally invariant to changes in the state variables. 
The quality of this approximation increases with the errors in the first order conditions for
optimization.12  
In terms of our discussion, this implies that the weights used in order to decompose the
output growth to its components have to change, and in fact in the above exercise we have not
changed them enough.  This would have stood out if we were calculating the TFP for shorter
periods.  It should be noted that measures of TFP based on index numbers with changing weights
are quite common, and, as indicated above, the measure used by Gardner is a refinement of the
results reported by Ball et al (1997) obtained using changing weights.13 
The jointness property is the source for the correlation between inputs and technology
shocks.  Technological, as well as other, shocks generally affect positively the intensive and
extensive margins, a subject we discuss  below.  The change in the extensive margin induces an
expansion of cultivated area.  The change in the intensive margin calls for an increase in inputs
associated with the new technology.  For instance  “Our regression analysis indicated that farm13
scale and the tractor adoption were co-determined.  Large scale induced greater adoption and
greater adoption, larger scale.  Given this result it is inappropriate to treat farm scale as an
exogenous variable.” (Olmstead and Rhode 2001  p. 693).  
There is a great variability among firms in scale of operation, which indicates that the
technology is not the sole factor in the determination of the farm size.  The scale of operation
reflects the implemented technology, and as such it is also influenced by idiosyncratic factors such
as managerial ability, financial constraints, discount rate, and expectations.  These attributes
determine the differential response to the changing technological and market situation.  This
explains the concentration of large farms in acreage, and in output (Gardner Table 3.4).  In
addition, there is the impact of attrition in family farms where the family continuity in operation is
not always secured.  In this case, the incentive to expand by farmers who do not see the continuity
is rather weak.
The correlation between inputs and technological shocks emerging from the jointness
property, is the source for the biased estimates of the empirical production function.  The bias has
been investigated in the context of panel data, where measures to overcome it are simpler to
develop.  Panels often consist of aggregate economies such as counties, regions, states, or
countries.  The variability that exists between the units, say countries, is thought to provide
information for reliable estimates of the function.  This is the underlying assumption in several of
the empirical studies reviewed by Gardner (Chapter 8).  But since the various units operate under
different sets of state variables, their implemented production functions are not the same.  This
argument is illustrated in a study of the agricultural production functions using data of 37 countries
for the period 1970-90, (Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer, 1999).  The study reports estimates of the
three canonical regressions of panel data,  based on variations between time, between countries,
and within country and time.  The results of the three regressions are very different, which is
inconsistent with the notion of a homogneous technolgy.  This is not the place to review the study
in detail.  We only mention that the median growth rate of agricultural GDP in the sample was 3.82
percent, and the decomposition, using the median rates of inputs change, results in about equal
contribution of the TF and TFP growth.
To sum up, because the decomposition of output growth to that of TF and TFP is
endogenous in the system, the growth accounting exercise is bound to yield different results under
different environments.  Is then the decomposition useful?  Yes, very much so, because it tells us
how the economic environment affects the growth process.  Specifically, it is shown that when
changes in the available technology increase the demand for inputs the supply of which is
constrained, most of the technical change will be absorbed by a rise of the shadow price of the
restricted inputs, this will increase the share of TF and reduce the share of the TFP.  This is14
14“The main focus of this paper is upon factor disequilibria that are causing widespread economic inefficiency in
the American economy and affecting adversely especially farming in the United States.” (Schultz 1947, fn 5,
p.646).  The supporting evidence consists of large disparity in average labor productivity within agriculture,
between agriculture and other sectors, and inequality of value marginal productivity of labor and capital with the
alternative returns.
illustrated by the experience of Asian countries, (Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer, 2002).  With this
insight, it is tempted to suggest that the US experience from about 1940 has represented a regime
with smoother flow of resources between agriculture and nonagriculture, or in the language of
Gardner, a more integrated markets.
Resource flow
The discussion of productivity brings us to the subject of resource flow.  Changes in the
state variables such as the available technology and incentives change the demand for the various
inputs.  The response to such changes depends on the supply of the inputs when more are needed,
as in the case of capital, or alternative employment when less are needed, as in the case of labor. 
Both, the demand and the supply may depend on constraints that affect the timing of the adjustment. 
Consequently, a gap is generated between the instantaneous shadow and market prices of the
inputs.  Under the assumption that inputs move from employments of low returns to employments of
high returns, which we name The Economic Law of Gravity (ELG), the gap will be narrowed with
time.  The pace of the adjustment depends on the magnitude of the gap.  The problem is of
particular interest when the decision is subject to setup or adjustment costs and as such is not
reversible without a loss.  The behavior of forward looking producers calls for considering the
future consequences of their decisions, taking into account the uncertainty involved in such an
evaluation.  The gap may be interpreted as an indication that the economy is in disequilibrium. 
This is the case with the assertion - made by Schultz (1947), adopted by Griliches (1963), and by
Gardner - that US agriculture has been in disequilibrium over a very long period.  This assertion
focuses on static equilibrium, but as such it is not very revealing in our attempt to understand the
behavior of the economy.14  It is important to realize that we deal here with dynamic behavior and
the relevant concept is that of dynamic equilibrium.  Making this switch, we find ourselves in a
search for the determinants of such equilibrium and of the pace of the resource movements in line
with the ELG.  This is well illustrated in the case of changes in the agricultural labor force.
Labor
As we have seen, the agricultural labor force declined considerably during the century as
labor moved from agriculture to nonagriculture.  Some of the workers, even though worked in the15
15This is the average of the series reported in Barkley (1990, Table 1)
nonagricultural sector continued to live on the farms.  For this reason, we name this change of
occupation as occupational migration.  The reason for this migration is the decline in the demand
for labor in agriculture, and the increase in the demand for labor in nonagriculture.  From the micro
point of view, the potential migrant chooses between the anticipated stream of income in the
various occupations.  It is postulated that the larger is the gap between the income in
nonagriculture and agriculture, the more workers will migrate.  This postulate provides the
conceptual framework for empirical migration studies using country time-series data and cross-
country data.  The driving variable in such studies is the intersectoral income differential, where
income is proxied by the average labor productivity.  Barkley (1990) studied the off-farm labor
migration in the US.  The dependent variable is the migration rate, measured as the ratio of
migration to the agricultural force.  The elasticity of the migration rate with respect to the
intersectoral income differential obtained from regressions covering the period 1940-85 is 4.5 for
total labor and 3.34 for farm operators.  This result is consistent with other country studies, as
well as cross-country studies, (Larson and Mundlak 1997, and Mundlak 2000 Chapter 9).  
The average annual US off-farm migration rate in the period 1940-1985 was 2.3 
percent.15  This is somewhat higher than the average rates for a large number of countries, which
are closer to 2 percent (Larson and Mundlak 1997).  This difference, however, is not sufficiently
large to account for the fact that the agricultural labor force declined relatively fast in the US
whereas in other countries, the pace was slower, or was even in the other direction, though weak. 
The reason is that the change in the labor force is determined by two variables, the migration rate
and the natural growth rate of the labor force.  Formally, let  m  be the migration rate,  n  the
population (or labor force) growth rate, than the change of the agricultural labor force between t-1
and t is given by:  Lt - Lt-1 = Lt-1(n - m).  Thus, when n is smaller than m, the labor force
declines.  This is the US experience.  In other countries, primarily developing countries, the
natural growth rate is still slightly higher than the migration rate and therefore the agricultural
labor force rises, although its share in the total labor force declines.  Does the decline of the
agricultural labor from 11 million in the beginning of the century to 3 million at the end of the
century indicates that throughout the century agriculture was in disequilibrium?  The answer is no. 
During the century, the state variables, and specifically the available technology, changed in
agriculture and in non agriculture, causing changes in the demand and supply of labor in
agriculture.  In each period the individuals made their choice given the prospects available to
them.  People differ in many respects pertinent to such a decision (such as age, gender, education,
health, family composition, ability, attitude toward risk)  and so some chose to move while others16
chose to stay. 
Capital
With all the reservations about the capital data, we turn to Table 3 which shows the growth
rates in the ratios related to capital.  The ratios of capital to output, and capital to land  declined in
the first period, but increased in the second one.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that capital
was relatively scarce in the first period, and that the big progress in the second period was
associated with capital deepening.  We have discussed above the financial crisis following the
events of WWI.  Alluding to the debts accumulated following the events of WWI, Clarke writes
that “[s]uch debts had precluded many individuals from making cash outlays for new equipment. ...
Critics found that creditors set maturities for all types of loans too short to suit many farmers. ” (
p.248).  There were geographical differences in the response to the financial situation;  “But what
was striking about this geographic variance was that the lag in tractor’s adoption varied
systematically with farmers’ financial problems: their margin of cash between receipts and
outlays, the variability of corn yields, the relative burden of debts, the proportion of indebted
farmers, and the relative deposit holdings of commercial banks.” (Op. cit p. 248)
This is supported by the information embedded in Gardner (Op. cit  Figure 3.7) which
indicates that during 1900-1940 interest payments as a share output fluctuated between 6 to 16
percent, as compared to the range of 2 to 6 percent in the period of fast growth of 1940 to 1973. 
The share rose again from 1973 to 1982 and reached 16 percent, before trending back to 6 percent
in 1994.  17
16See the note to Table 4, and also Rasmussen pp. 573-4.
17“Land productivity, measured by yield per acre, changed relatively little for most crops during the nineteenth
century, in large part because land, particularly in the western states, was not the resource on which most farmers
needed most to economize.  Indeed, initial yields following land clearing were often higher than those realized
later as soil nutrients depleted by repeated cropping were not replaced. ... The great improvement in yields lay
almost a century into the future when chemical fertilizers, hybrid seeds, irrigation, and various scientific
developments came into widespread use.” (Atack, Bateman, and Parker 2000, p. 259-60) 
 More evidence - US agriculture in the nineteenth century
We now extend the discussion to review some of the US experience in the nineteenth
century.  The information for this period, particularly for the first half of the century, is more
sparse, and of inferior quality compared to that for the twentieth century.  This judgement is made
explicit in some of the sources we depend on in our discussion.  The information, nevertheless,
serves the discussions on the developments in the nineteenth century, and we follow this practice
with the same qualifications.
To provide perspective we summarize in Table 4 information related to the economy, in
addition to that for agriculture. The nineteenth century was a period of strong growth, in agriculture
and more so in the economy.  As shown, the growth rate of GNP was roughly 4 percent, and this
exceeded the rates observed for agriculture.  Much of the growth is attributed to growth in inputs,
and less to productivity.  For the economy, the growth of TFP accounted for only 15 and 18
percent of output growth in the two subperiods.
The growth rate of agricultural output in the nineteenth century was high relative to that of
the twentieth century.  Much of this growth came from the expansion to new land.  At the beginning
of the century, land, capital, and labor grew (or assumed so) at similar rates, but as the century
wore on the growth rate of labor started to lag behind that of land, leading to a rise in the land-
labor ratio.16  The decline in the growth rate of labor relative to that of output, land and capital
continued throughout the century and accelerated in the twentieth century.  The changes in
agricultural labor are reflected in the rates of  labor migration out of agriculture.  The migration
rate picked steam as time wore on.  
Unlike average labor productivity, average land productivity did not change much.17  
Capital grew faster than labor, and more so in the economy than in agriculture.  Still the growth
rate of capital in agriculture was high.  The major part of the agricultural capital was in land
improvement, but that changed with time.  “The structural changes in the composition of capital
influenced the means by which the capital stock was assembled.  In the antebellum years, almost
half of the depreciable capital stock (constant prices) consisted of agricultural land improvements,
many of them created by family labor, or labor attached to plantation on which they were18
18“Ross suggested that transitions in agriculture had been “delayed, halting, hesitant, as well as uneven between
regions and even, at times, adjoining farms.  The same year, Clarence H. Danhof showed that even as simple a
device as the revolving horse rake had slow acceptance among farmers.” (Rasmussen 1962, pp. 578-9). 
 “Although agriculture was expanding onto the more fertile midwestern soils during the 1820s and 1830s, these
years do not seem to have been ones of marked practices, or techniques, whereas in the Civil War years and
immediately thereafter, mechanization was proceeding rapidly and there were more organized and systematic
efforts to diffuse knowledge about best-practice farm methods.” (Atack, Bateman, and Parker, p. 258).
 A review of the debate and the result of data revisions is given by Weiss (1993).  Weiss concludes that “The Civil
constructed, or by other local sources of labor.  These work were typically carried out in the off
season, .... Little external finance were required to carry them out.  But the structural changes of
modernization brought to the fore industries, forms of capital, and organizational scales of
operation that enhanced the roles of markets and of external finance in the provision of capital.”
(Gallman 1986, p. 200).   The percentage share of farm improvement in agricultural capital (total
capital), was: 61 (38) in 1840,  58 (22) in 1880, and 54 (12) in 1900, (Op. cit Table 4.2).  
The need for capital required some choices to be made:  “Farming became increasingly
expensive in late nineteenth century.  The real price of land was rising throughout the period until
World War I.  Moreover, mechanization, a growing imperative for successful farmer, further
strained the financial resources of farmers.  For many, tenancy was the only way to farm, but others
chose to borrow.” (Attack, Bateman, and Parker, p. 274).  “Mortgages typically lasted three years
or less and might be renewed, though renewal terms were never certain.  The long-term, amortized
mortgages so familiar today did not begin to appear until the 1920s.” (Ibid).
Additional evidence is provided in Table 5, which  presents growth rates of factor
intensity and average productivity for three leading crops, calculated from data in Rasmussen
(Table 1).  The data show a continuous rise in the land-labor ratio for all the three crops, at a
faster rate than that observed for  total agriculture.  Labor was diverted to the extensive margin,
and there was little growth in the output-land ratio, which marks the intensive margin.  This is
mirrored in the rise of the output-labor  ratio. 
Historians mark two revolutions in American agriculture due to technical change: First, the
change from manpower to animal power centered around the Civil War.  The second is the change
from animal to mechanical power, and the adoption of chemistry to agricultural production.  It
centered around World-War II.  The latter period was covered in the foregoing discussion and we
concentrate here on the nineteenth century. There is a debate on whether these were revolution or
evolution, because the transition, as important as it was, evolved gradually.  Regardless of the
definition, the important developments that were taking place at the time, illustrate the existence of
time lag between changes in the available technology and its complete implementation, and the
uneven implementation between regions.18  The uneven implementation of the available19
War, or at least the decade of the 1860s, may have marked a turning point in productivity, as has been suggested by
many earlier writers.” (P. 339)
technology is an economic decision, reflecting the pertinent economic environment.  Indeed,
Rasmussen argues that the rate of adoption of machinery and other technological advances
benefitted from the sharp rise in demand in the Civil War and World-War II (Rasmussen 1962, 
pp. 578-9).
In the case of the first American agricultural revolution, “It is important to note that every
stage in the growing of grain was amenable to the use of horse-drawn machines by 1860. ,..., A
backlog of technology, particularly in the form of horse drawn machinery, was available by 1860. 
The Civil War provided the incentive and the opportunity for its adoption, especially in the
Midwest.  The rate of investment in farm machinery and the implements increased rapidly from
1850 to 1880, and then declined.” (Op cit, pp.  580-81).  The jointenss property is embedded in
the following statements:  “The results of the confluence of technological advances, manpower
shortages, better prices, and greater demand may be seen, at least in part in Table 1.”  (Op cit, p. 
582).   “The effect of the first American agricultural revolution and the fact that it was a revolution
rather than an evolution are shown by J. W. Kendrick.  In his net output, input, and productivity
ratios for agriculture.” (Op cit, pp. 583-4).  The implied growth rates of Kendrick’s index of
average labor productivity are 1.67 and 0.67 percent for the periods 1869-1879 and 1879-1889
respectively.  “From 1880 to 1940, increases in productivity, ..., flatten out, indicating that the first
American agricultural revolution was at an end.”  (Ibid).  
There is no unanimous agreement on the foregoing description of causality.  Olmstead
(1976) attributes the mechanization to a decline in the real prices of harvesting equipment which
was triggered by increasing competition in the industry.  This caused nominal prices to remain
constant, while other prices, and specifically wages rose.  Thus, the pace of the implementation is
related to changes in the price environment.  Christensen argues that the availability of cheap
power and high labor cost were the incentives to mechanization.  The emphasis here is a
comparison with England, and not the timing of the implementation in the US. (Christensen 1981,
p. 326).  As such, this is a cross-country comparison of fundamentals, rather than of time series
variability.
To sum up, the distinction between revolution and evolution is guided by the rates of
change in the actual output, rather than by the changes in the available technology.  As such, it
reflects the pace of the implementation of the changes in the available technology, which was
determined by the economic environment.20
Factor augmentation
The evidence in Tables 4 and 5 ties up the output growth with the factor supply and the
available technology.  But this is only part of the story, the rest involves the technical change.  The
declining labor-land ratio is commonly attributed to mechanization, or to labor-augmenting
technical change.  This, however, does not exclude land augmenting changes.  In a series of papers,
Olmstead and Rhode (1993, 2000, 2002) document relentless efforts in the nineteenth century of
land augmenting activities, such as the development of new varieties, pest control etc.  Accepting
the existence of such activities, the question is what can we say about the relative strength of the
changes in the factor augmenting functions.  Recall that we cannot answer this question by tracing
the changes in the average productivity and in factor ratios alone.  We turn therefore to explore the
relationship between the marginal rate of substitution and the factor ratio.  In this we utilize data on
the price ratio of land to wages.  During the mid 1880s land prices appreciated at fairly high rates
in response to market returns.  “Despite vocal protests to the contrary, American farmers were not
doing badly.  They averaged return of 6 to 10 percent on current production, a usually realized
capital gain of 3 to 7 percent.” (Atack, Bateman, and Parker 2000, p. 277).   This was reflected in
the price ratio of land to labor.  “Data are scarce before the midcentury mark, but standard
historical accounts suggest that between 1790 and 1850 the number of days of farm labor required
to purchase an acre of agricultural land increased two - to threefold (Christensen 1981; Lindert
1988a, 1988b).” (Olmstead and Rhode, 1993, pp. 104-5).  We will use the information in
Christensen (Op. cit Table 1) showing that the price of 1 acre of land increased from 1.1 labor
weeks in 1790 to 2.9 labor weeks in 1850.  The implied average growth rate of the land-labor
price ratio for 1790-1850 is 1.3 percent.  The price ratio stood at 33.8 in 1850, and at 64.7 in
1880, and 63.8 in 1900 (Olmstead and Rhode 1993, Table 1).  This translates to an average
growth rate of 2.19 percent between 1850 and 1880, and practically no growth between 1880 and
1900.  In view of the reservation on the accuracy of the data for the nineteenth century, we note that
the procedure we are about to follow is applied later on to other data, and that the results are
consistent.
In what follows we deal with a world of two factors, labor and land, which are the most
pertinent to our discussion.  As in reality there are more inputs, our analysis assumes that the
production function is separable in the sense that the marginal rate of substitution of labor and land
is unaffected by the level of the other inputs.  This is assumed to be a reasonable first order
approximation, and in fact embedded in most of the empirical analyses.  A more general analysis
is presented in the appendix.  Turning to equation (1), K stands for land, the average labor
productivity of physical labor is y=ILf(Jk), where J = IK/IL is a measure of the technical change
bias.  The function f(.) is defined in terms of the efficiency units, it is concave and maintains:  f(0)21
19An expository discussion (3) is given in Mundlak (2000, Chapter 5).  The empirical testing of the bias in the
technical change is discussed by Binswanger (1978). 
20Alternatively, we can express (14) in terms of factor shares.  The ratio of the factor shares of labor to that of
land is 2/ T/k, hence d ln 2/ dln T - dln k.  Substitue in (4), and rearrange to obtain: (1-F) dln J = dln 2 - (1-F) dln
T. 
21According to Christensen the rental rate in terms of labor grew at an average rate of 1.8 percent between 1790
and 1850, which is more than the growth rate of the land-price-wage ratio.  In this sense, our calculation is
conservative.
22 The identification problem is discussed in (Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez, 1978).  Binswanger (1978)
tries to overcome the identification problem by following a two stage procedure.  Using data for US agriculture, he
estimates first the price effect (F in equation 4 above) from pooled state data, and second the estimated price
effect is used in aggregate time-series data to estimate the bias in the technical change.  This is based on the
assumption that the identification problem is suppressed in the cross-section.  There is however no reason that this
= 0, f N(0) = 4,  f(4) = 4, f N(4)  = 0.  When the wage-rent ratio, T (Te), is equal to the ratio of the
marginal productivity of labor to land in physical (efficiency) units, we can write19 
J T(k) = Te(Jk) (3)
Label the elasticity of the function Te(Jk) as 1/F, and refer to F as the elasticity of substitution, and
note the restriction, F>0.   Write the differential of (3), and rearrange terms to obtain20
(4) ( ) ln ln ln 1- = - s t s w d d d k
To apply this result empirically using average growth rates, we seek a function that is
consistent with the evidence, and maintains the properties of a production function as specified
above.  For this, we approximate the differentials in (4) and (2) with average growth rates, using
the notation dln x/dt = gx.  We assume that the changes in the factor price ratios reflect with
sufficient precision the changes in the marginal rate of substitution, and that the average growth
rate of the rent on land is equal to that of the price of land.21  Note that we apply the assumptions
to averages over a long period, and as such they are not as strict as if they were applied to annual
variations.  We can then use the rates of change of the labor-land price ratio given above as the
rates of change of T.  
We note that for positive growth of the land-labor ratio (which is the case for the values in
Table 4), and negative growth of wage-rent ratio, the right hand side of equation (4) is negative. 
To isolate gJ  we need the value of F, but we have only one equation to solve for the two
unknowns, F and gJ.22  We can, however, tell the direction of the technical change bias for22
is indeed the case.  In addition, there is the question of the invariance of the production function to the sample. 
Binswanger realizes difficulties by observing that “Of course, we will never find a cross section where all units are
on exactly the same production function.” (Op. cit p. 232).  This lack of robustness in the estimates is an outcome
of  the fact that in a world of heterogenous technology, the production function estimates depend on the state
variables that determine the choice of the implemented technology.  For discussion of the subject, see (Mundlak
2001).
23Attack, Batman, and Parker (2000, Table 6.1) provide estimates of TFP for total agriculture, which are said to be
based on Weiss.  Weiss (1993, Table 4),  presents these very same figures as growth rates for output per worker of
farm gross product (“broad definition”).  we thus suspect that these values are actually growth rates of average
labor productivity, rather then of TFP, and therefore do not use them here. 
reasonable values of F.  Specifically, when the right hand side of (4) is negative, values of  F<1,
are sufficient for gJ<0, meaning that in this case the technical change bias was labor augmenting. 
This conclusion does not require that F be constant throughout the period, the result applies as long
as F is smaller than one.  The combination of  F<1, and labor augmenting technical change yields a
decline in the ratio of the factor shares of labor to that of land, as can also be seen from the
footnote 20, meaning that the technical change was labor saving.  This is consistent with the
common wisdom.
We also apply this procedure in Table 6 to the twentieth century data.  Our data on land
prices begin in 1910, and this determines the starting year.  The jump in the average land
productivity which began around 1940 has made it of interest to examine if that has affected the
results, and for this reason we examine also the period 1940-50.  The wage-rent ratio declined in
1950-90, thus the sign of the right hand side of equation (4) is negative, the same as in the
nineteenth century.  For the other periods in the table the sign of the right hand side of (4) is
ambiguous in that both, gk and  gT, are positive.  Here we have two possibilities.  The first is
when gk > gT > 0.  By inspection of equation (4), and given F<1, we conclude that 0 > gJ.  The
second case is where gT > gk > 0.  In this case we derive an upper bound for F for which gJ is
negative, and refer to it as the critical value.  The results are reported in the last line of Table 6. 
Thus, the values of F which are consistent with labor augmenting bias are bounded from above by
0.79 for the period of 1910-1940, 0.94 for the period 1940-1950, and 1 otherwise.  The period
1910-1940 is an interesting period because it was the prelude to the jump in the land augmenting
technical change.  It has the lowest critical value but still to have land augmentation bias, it would
require F to exceed 0.79, which is unlikely.  Also notethat in the subsequent periods when the big
jump in yields was occurring, the bias was still labor augmenting.
We can now go further one step and obtain orders of magnitude for the growth rates of the
augmenting functions.  We do it for the values in the nineteenth century, concentrating on the role of
land and labor and ignoring the role of capital.  For this we need the growth rates of TFP, gI.23   23
24 Also, “The westward drift dragged down the average quality of American farm land faster than the 0.29 percent
annual quality of improvements on fixed sites.”  (Lindert 1988, p. 51).  See also Cochrane (1993, Chapter 5).
25Thus, compared to the foregoing discussion, A replaces K, x=1/k, and "=1/J.
In our derivation of the TFP we use equation (2), and assume equal weights to labor and land,
$=0.5.  For the individual crops we have only one version, based on our calculation.
We use the definition gJ = gIK - gIL  to estimate the bias for two possible values of F, 0.2
and 0.5, and the growth rates in Table 4.  The results are presented in  Table 7.  In most cases, the
growth rate of the labor augmenting component is sizable, whereas that of the land augmenting is
either negative, or positive but weak.  The difference in the growth rates of the two augmenting
functions broadens for F=0.5.  
It is hard to believe that there was a deterioration of the land augmenting function,
particularly in light of the various efforts made to improve the biological practices, as documented
by Olmstead and Rhode (1993, 2000, 2002) .  If this is the case, how can we explain the results? 
A convincing explanation given by Olmstead and Rhode (2002) is that the new lands brought under
cultivation were either of lower quality, or needed changes in varieties or other practices to
maintain the observed yield level.24  Under this claim, the average yield should have declined,
and if it did not, this is an outcome of the land-augmenting technical change.  They make some
calculations to quantify the effect of the variability in quality.  The question is whether the
allowance for heterogeneous land quality is sufficient to elevate the growth rate of the land
augmenting function to that of the labor augmenting function.  To answer this, we take a different
tack and explore the issue without resorting to the average yield, and the answer is negative. 
Land of heterogeneous quality
In what follows we outline the model with heterogeneous land, and state pertinent results. 
The discussion is based on Mundlak (2000 pp. 157-161).  We change the notations slightly,
labeling the available amount of quality q land as  A(q), where q is assumed to be a continuous
variable that takes on nonnegative values; the higher is the value of q, the better is the land.   The
cultivated land is all the land of quality q$z, where z is the marginal quality, characterized by zero




there are only two inputs, land and labor, L(q) is the amount of labor allocated to quality q land,
and x(q) is the ratio of labor to land adjusted for quality,  x(q) = L(q)/qA(q).25  Total agricultural24
labor is  . L x q qA q dq
z =
¥
￿ ( ) ( )
To allow the marginal rate of factor substitution to depend on land quality, the production
function is expressed in terms of land measured in quality units, qA(q).  The production function is
linear homogeneous: 
Y(q) = F[IAqA(q), ILL(q)] = I"qA(q)f[ax(q)] (5) 
where " = IL/IA is the bias in the technical change, IA is the land augmenting technical change,
and serves here as the neutral component, and hereon will be denoted by I.  The bias is labor
(land) augmenting when " is larger (smaller) than 1.  The output per unit of quality q land is
Y(q)/A(q) = Iqf(ax), and total output is  
Y Y q dq qf x q A q dq
z z = =
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The quantities A, L, and Y are functions of z and x(q); these in turn are determined by the
state variables which vary with the specification of the model.  Let w be the wage rate of physical
labor, p be the product price, and c be the unit cost of using land, independent of its quality.  The
rent on quality q land is   R(q) = pIqf["x(q)] - c - wqx(q).  Differentiate R(q) with respect to q to
obtain  RN(q) = [R(q)+c]/q > 0.  The neutral component of technical change and the product price
play a similar role in the equation, so we combine them conveniently,  H/pI.  The optimization
problem is
(6)
The first order conditions are:
  "f `["x(q)] = w/H (7)
Hzf["x(z)] = [wzx(z) + c] (8)
 The elasticity of labor demand is , = ln x / M ln w/H, note that  ,< 0.  Following the general
framework in the appendix, we differentiate (7), and rearrange terms to obtain:25
(9) d x q d d w H ln ( ) ( ) ln ln( / ) = - + + e a e 1
Hence  . ¶ ¶ a e ln ( )/ ln x q iff < > > - 0 0 1
The differentiation of (8) yields:






ln ( )[ ln ln ] ln = - + a
Hence  . ¶ ¶ a ln / ln z < 0
The impact of technical change and prices on the two margins is summarized in Table 8.
An increase in " increases the rent on land of all qualities, and thereby marginal land is
brought under cultivation.  As labor becomes more productive, there is an expansion of the  supply
of efficiency-labor at the rate dln ", which presses down the wage rate and thus increases the
quantity demanded.  The extent of the response to the wage decline depends on ,.  When the
demand is inelastic, the increase in the quantity demanded of efficiency labor is insufficient to
match the increase in its supply and the labor-land ratio declines.  The outcome is summarized as
follows:
Proposition  When agriculture is a price taker, labor-augmenting technical change increases the
rent on land of all qualities, thus reduces the marginal quality land and increases the cultivated
area.  The labor-land ratio declines when the elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one.
The changes covered by the proposition are consistent with the evidence for US agriculture
in the nineteenth century.  Land, land-labor ratio, the rent and the rent-wage ratio all increased. 
These changes are inconsistent with the other possibilities of technical change.  Land-augmenting
technical change acts in the opposite direction, and thus increases the labor-land ratio and this is
inconsistent with the data, and thus ruled out as the typical case.  Neutral technical, like the product
price, have a positive effect on the intensive margin and are therefore ruled out as the typical case. 
Aside of this, real product prices trended down as a result of the technical change, and thus the
impact of the technical change was offset in part by the price decline.
This analysis yields the same qualitative result of labor augmenting bias obtained above
under the assumption of homogeneous land.  This, however, does not rule out land augmenting, or
neutral changes, it just says that the labor augmenting change was dominating. 
In this discussion, we have concentrated on the impact of technical change, and neglected26
the impact of the cost involved in the operation of land, c, and the nature of the labor supply.  The
cost can have various interpretations, depending on the context.  In the case of expansion to new
territories, it would represent the cost of reaching the site and of bringing the land under
cultivation.  In that case, the model could be extended to multi period optimization.  As reviewed
above, there was a considerable investment in infrastructure of the land augmenting nature, and
also in investment in land clearing and improvements.  The cost term could also include tax or
subsidy, as well as the payments for set aside land under government programs of supply control. 
The cost could also be made a function of q.  As to labor supply, we assumed it to be perfectly
elastic at the ongoing wages, but this could be modified to upward sloping market supply.  All
these are interesting possibilities, but they are unlikely to modify our qualitative conclusion and
therefore are not pursued here. 
Innovations 
What can we learn about innovations from the changes in the factor productivity?  The
answer is not much, and definitely less than some studies suggest.  The experience of US
agriculture is part of the paradigm of the development of American and Japanese agriculture told
by Hayami and Ruttan in which the hypothesis of induced innovation plays a center role.  The
hypothesis views innovations “[a]s a process of easing the constraints on production imposed by
inelastic supplies of land and labor.” (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985 p.4).   This is translated into price
signals: “The Hicks theory of induced innovation implies that a rise in the price of one factor
relative to that of other factors induces a sequence of technical changes that reduces the use of that
factor relative to the use of other factor inputs.”(Op. Cit. p.85).  This is not meant to be just another
theory, it aspires to replace “The process by which technical change is generated has traditionally
been treated as exogenous to the economic system - as a product of autonomous advances in
scientific and technical knowledge.”(Op. Cit p.84).  It should be pointed out right at  the outset that
the theory is concerned with the bias in technical change and thereby excludes the neutral
component.  By this token alone it is rather narrow in scope.
To relate the hypotheses to our discussion of the implemented technology we write the
augmenting functions as functions of the state variables:  Ij (s), j=K, L, and s stands for a vector of
state variables.  The hypothesis sets s=K/L as an indicator of the resource constraints, or
alternatively, under the translation to price ratio, s=T.  This is the essence of the following
statement:  “In the United States the long-term decline in the prices of land and machinery relative
to wages ... could be expected to encourage the substitution of land and power for labor. ... In
Japan the supply of land was inelastic and the price of land rose relative to wages.  It was not27
therefore, plausible to substitute land and power for labor.  Instead the new opportunities arising
from continuous declines in the price of fertilizers relative to the price of land were exploited
through advances in biological technology.”  (Hayami and Ruttan 1971, pp 123-4).  
Limitations of the paradigm of the induced innovation as applied to US agriculture are
discussed by Olmstead and Rhode (1993).  In addition to questioning some stylized facts,  they
dispel the story on basically two grounds.  First the hypothesis that the abundance of land relative
to labor in the US would result in an increase of the wage-land-price ratio, is inconsistent with the
evidence.  As has already been indicated above, during the period of the big land expansion in the
nineteenth century the price of land increased substantially relative to wages.  This rise is expected
and is consistent with the analysis of the previous section; labor-augmenting technical change
increases the rent on land of all qualities, and larger rent should translate into higher land price. 
Thus, land price responded to technical change and not the opposite, and the expected causality is
consistent with the evidence and not with the hypothesis.  Second, Olmstead and Rhode document
various research efforts in land-augmenting activities in the nineteenth century.  We return to this
subject below.
Our conclusion of labor-augmenting bias is in the US is in line with the Hayami Ruttan
paradigm.  On the other hand, the decline in the wage-land-price during the period of land
expansion is not but, nevertheless, it is supportive to the finding of labor augmenting bias.  This is,
however, only part of the story, the other part is Japan.  To complete the story, we repeat the
calculations to include Japan.  To avoid data disputes, we use the Hayami and Ruttan data, as
reported in Ruttan et al (1978, Tables 3-1, and 3-2).  The results are presented in Table 9.
For a background, we present the growth rate of output, where we see a difference between
the two countries in the first period (1880-1930); it was 1.62 percent in Japan and only 1.03 in the
US.  This difference disappears in the second period.  Turning to factor growth, Japan, considered
as the land scarce country, or where “the supply of land was inelastic”, had a handsome average
growth rate of land of 0.47 percent in the first period, and the wage-land-price ratio declined in
this period.  These changes are consistent with the US paradigm, and this is the period where
Japan is claimed to have followed a different innovation path.  The land growth came to a halt in
Japan in the second period.  There is also a great deal of similarity between the two countries in
the change of the agricultural labor in the first period.  The trend is also similar in the second
period, but the decline was stronger in the US.  The fast decline in the US is related to the off-farm
migration, discussed above, and has to do more with the development of nonagriculture than with
the induced innovation hypothesis.  The wage-land-price ratio declined in Japan in 1880-1930,
similar to the evidence for the US in Table 4, and thus the right hand side of equation (4) is28
negative, and for F<1 the technical change is labor augmenting.  For the other cases in Table 9 we
compute the critical F, as we did in Table 6.  The result is 1 in the US in both periods, and in Japan
in the first period, and 0.7 for Japan in the second period.  Yeung and Roe (1978) estimate a CES
production function, with a variety of modifications aiming to capture the induced innovation
effect, using data for Japan 1880-1940, reach a similar conclusion.  This leads us to conclude that
the bias in the technical change was labor augmenting in both countries.  Incidentally, the highest
estimate of the elasticity of substitution that Yeung and Roe report for Japan is 0.26.  Recall, labor
augmenting technical change and F<1 implies labor saving technical change.  Thus, whatever
merits the Hayami Ruttan paradigm might have, it is not supported by their own data.  
Beside the message on the direction of the technical change, there is an implication
concerning the approach to the empirical verification of the hypothesis.  The fundamental
weakness is in that the judgement on the nature of the intended innovations is based on the
observed changes in factor productivity and not on the innovation process itself.  To sharpen the
discussion, we should distinguish between two production processes, the first, labeled generically
as research, produces changes in the available technology and the second is the production, which
uses technology and inputs to produce the final product.  The connection between the research
effort and the realization in terms of measured productivity gains is not immediate:  First, there is
the subject of identifying and measuring the research effort, which should deal directly with the
resources devoted to research.  This direct approach can also help in judging what has induced the
research, and what have been the objectives and the time profile of the expected results. 
Specifically, it may also shed light on the extent to which the research builds on “autonomous
advances in scientific and technical knowledge.”  If we take the term “induced innovation”
nominally, this is the only stage which is pertinent to the hypothesis and the rhetoric of the induced
innovation.  Second, there is the subject of the research productivity, which relates the effort to
outcome.  Good intentions, in research like in other matters, do not always lead to the desired
results.  In research, the gap is related to the fundamental fact that there is no production function
for knowledge.  Presumably, the innovation opportunity frontier should guide resources to their
more productive use.  The problem is that such a frontier, purely speaking, is nonexistent,
(Mundlak 2000, p.362), and judgement has to be passed on less solid ground.  Not independently,
there is a question of the timing of the realization, sometimes the results are obtained with long
lags.  For instance, Olmstead and Rhode (2002) argue that the green revolution has its roots in the
research efforts made in the nineteenth century.  Work on hybrid corn started at the beginning of the
twentieth century, but it was not put to work until the 1930s, (Griliches, 1957).  These illustrate
research activity with the objective of  land augmentation, but the outcome was a late bloomer.29
Finally, there is the question of implementation.  Not everything that is known is
immediately implemented.  After all, the inventors and users are two different groups, each is
motivated by different criteria, sets of incentives, and constraints.  This is illustrated by the claim
made by Rasmussen with respect to the implementation of new technology in response to the
changes in the economic environment following the Civil War and World-War II.  The technology
was already there, and it was a change in the economic environment that triggered the
implementation.  Similarly, Gavin Wright (1986), and Peterson and Kislev (1986) relate the
adoption of cotton pickers to the economic environment.  In fact, Hayami and Ruttan state that in
Japan, “The tractor was not adopted extensively until World War II.”(Op. Cit, p.171).  This is a
statement about implementation and not about innovation.
We finally come back to the second point of Olmstead and Rhode who document various
research efforts of land-augmenting activities in the nineteenth century.  For instance,  “[t]he
nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed a stream of  “biological” innovations that rivaled
the importance of mechanical changes on agricultural productivity growth.  These new biological
technologies addressed two distinct classes of problems.  First, there was a relentless campaign to
discover and develop new wheat varieties and cultural methods to allow the wheat frontier to
expand into the Northern Prairies, the Great Plains, and the Pacific Coast states.”(Olmstead and
Rhode 2002).  The second effort aimed at pest control. This is a direct report on research effort,
not blurred by the productivity of the research and by the degree of the implementation of the
available technology.  
To sum up the argument, there was no lack of trying to get land-augmenting technical
change.  Simply, the outcome was less dramatic than in the case of labor augmentation, because the
mechanical innovations were so much more effective.  This edge, most likely, reflects possibilities
generated by the overall technological developments in the economy, largely exogenous to
agriculture.  The most dramatic changes in technology originated in the manufacturing sector, and it
would hard to assume that profit on the production of the new machines was overlooked by their
developers and producers.  To this we can add that narrowing down the research objective to
labor saving innovations would fail to explain the growing successful agricultural research in the
US and the world over in spite of the continuous decline in real agricultural prices.  This effort,
both public and private, can only be justified by expectations that the research will pay off,
regardless of the direction of the augmentation, and that the innovations will be implemented.  
On the methodological aspect, we should recognize that the empirical analysis triggered by
the hypothesis of induced innovation in agriculture has mostly dealt with the implementation of
technologies rather than with innovations.  Failing to realize it leads to some obscure30
26For instance “I study productivity in terms of the diffusion of technology...” (Clarke, p. 13)
consequences.  Specifically, the jointness property of the implemented technology makes explicit
the relationship between the technology and the inputs and thus precludes statements that factor
ratios are independent of the technical change.  
Implementation and incentives
Technical change has moved agricultural output in the US, as elsewhere.  The foregoing
discussion has emphasized that the available technology is only one determinant of the
implemented technology.  The other determinants include incentives and constraints.  Often, the
spread of technology is viewed as a process of diffusion.26  This term is somewhat misleading in
that it creates an aura of a passive process, whereas in reality entrepreneurs are active in their
decisions on the implementation of the available technology.  If we were to obtain the production
function in (1) as the maintained hypothesis, then all the state variables, and specifically the
available technology, would appear as arguments of the augmenting functions, as well as in the
production function itself.  
The evaluation of productivity changes within the framework of the implemented
technology is discussed in (Mundlak, 1988, 2000, 2001).  Empirically, as productivity generally
increases with time, trended variables turn out to be “good” explanatory variables, whereas non
trended variables seem to perform poorly.  The first group includes measures of human capital,
research, and infrastructure, whereas the second group includes incentives.  In what follows we
review some evidence and  fundamental difficulties encountered in capturing the impact of
incentives in empirical analysis.  The role of the incentives in the determination of productivity
changes is most difficult to identify empirically, and for good reasons.  To clarify what is behind
this difficulty, we have to ask ourselves why should the introduction of more profitable techniques
depend on prices.  If the new technique is more productive, it is likely to be profitable even under
a price decline.  This is, after all, the big picture with respect to technical change in agriculture in
the last century, which has taken place under declining price environment.  In fact, the causality is
from technical change to prices.  
To a large extent, the scope for the positive role of prices in the implementation of new
techniques is related to the jointness property of the implemented technology.  This is the  case
when the implementation of the new techniques requires new investment.  In part this due to
embodied technical change (Solow, 1959).  The foregoing discussion has shown the importance of
mechanization in the development of agriculture.  To benefit from the productivity of the tractor31
27 Tractor prices deflated by the GDP deflator start at a level of 100 in 1910, declined sharply to roughly 30 in
1920, and remained there more or less with small variability until 1960.  Quality adjustment would probably show
further declinde from 1920.  Interestingly, the price of horses had a similar pattern until 1942 and then realized a
sharper decline to a level of the 20s. (Olmstead and Rhode, 2001)
28For instance, referring to the role of the financial constraints on purchases of tractors: “But what was striking
about this geographic variance was that the lag in tractor’s adoption varied systematically with farmers’ financial
problems: their margin of cash between receipts and outlays, the variability of corn yields, the relative burden of
debts, the proportion of indebted farmers, and the relative deposit holdings of commercial banks.” (Op. cit p. 248)
someone must acquire the tractor.  The investment responds favorably to higher product price,
lower factor price, and lower risk over its life time.27  
The embodied technical change constitutes a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for
the jointness property.  The green revolution in Asia, where new productive varieties of rice and
wheat were introduced, provides an example of jointness generated by disembodied technical
change.  These varieties have reached their potential under irrigation and heavy doses of
fertilizers.  The progress of their implementation was therefore paced by the mobilization of
resources for expanding the irrigated area and fertilizers production, (McGuirk and Mundlak,
1991, Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer, 2002).  But resources move with incentives, and this is where
the prices and risk come in.  Once the investment has been made, and the necessary infrastructure
put in place, it is usable for future improvement, such as new varieties.  At that stage the shift to the
new varieties will not depend on prices to the extent it did when the initial investment had to be
made.  Consequently, in the case of disembodied technical change, we can observe a ratchet effect;
investment made for the implementation of a new technology is likely to accommodate future
technical changes.  When this feature is ignored in empirical analysis, the impact of prices is
distorted.
There are various claims on the relevance of prices to the implementation of new
technology. Griliches’s (1957) relates the trend in the adoption of hybrid corn to market forces. 
Cochrane and Ryan  (1976, p.373) attribute the surge in productivity to the price and income
support programs, which provided both stability and desirable income level.  Clarke (1994)
argues convincingly on the role of capital and liquidity constraints in the mechanization of US
agriculture in the post World War I period.28  
Reservations with respect to the importance of prices come from more structural empirical
analysis (Huffman and Evenson 1993, Gonipath and Roe 1997).  Such analysis follows a recursive
procedure where first a production function is estimated, second the function is used to generate
the TFP series, which in turn is analyzed to find its determinants.  This procedure conceals the
contribution of the technology, as well as the other state variables, to the variability of the inputs,32
and distorts the results, and thereby does not provide the true estimates of the TFP and the
variables associated with it.  The reason is that the orthogonal decomposition of output changes to
inputs and productivity distorts the contribution of the technical change.  This follows from the
jointness property of the implemented technology, which asserts that the two components are not
orthogonal.  This is similar in concept to the effect of ignoring fixed effects in the estimation of
production functions from panel data. In terms of the econometric analysis, the parameters of the
production function, and the inputs are both functions of the state variables, including prices,
constrains and technology.  This recognition is important in that it provides a conceptual
framework for the evaluation of the evidence, and also in guiding us to alternative approaches to
the estimation.  In essence, the state variables should be included in the empirical production
functions in the same way as the inputs.  As many of the variables are trended, this would lead to
multicollineairty.  This problem, however, is an expression of the implementation process and not
of the framework.  This is not the place to discuss techniques to overcome the multicollinearity
problem.
Welfare consequences
Consumers enjoyed a substantial decline in the price of the agricultural product and thus
benefitted greatly from the growth in agricultural productivity. Another positive outcome of the
agricultural growth has been the supply of labor to the nonagricultural sector, which facilitated the
growth of nonagriculture.  This is true for the US as well as for most countries.
It remains to consider how the growth affected farmers.  This is not a trivial question
because it requires to define who is a farmer for this purpose.  Over the twentieth century the
number of workers in US agriculture was sized down to almost one fourth, and the number of farms
declined to one third.  Obviously, the farmers who moved out of agriculture decided that the
opportunities in nonagriculture exceeded those in agriculture.  The evidence indicates that they
were not wrong.  The proportion of income from nonagricultural activities in the income of farm
households has reached one half.  This suggests that as far as income foregone by moving out of
agriculture, the average migrant has benefitted.  This is the only way to explain the sizable
migration from agriculture.  If we contemplate what would have been the income in agriculture in
the absence of such migration, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the off-farm migration had a
major role in the alleviation of rural poverty (Mundlak 1999).
And what about those who remained in farming?  There are two specific factors that
absorb the rent of the sector: land for the sector as a whole, and the returns to entrepreneurship or 
management of farm operators.  Figure 4 presents the land prices in the US, Canada, Japan, and33
South Africa for a long time period (Mundlak, Larson, and Crego, 1998).  The top panel shows the
real prices obtained by deflating the nominal land prices by the agricultural GDP deflator.  As
such, this price is expressed in terms of the agricultural product, say cereals.  The level of this
land price in 1993 was about three times higher than that in 1910.  In fact, it was about four times
higher around 1980, but has declined thereafter.  This development reflects the fact that because of
technical change, land is more valuable in terms of the agricultural product.  The pattern is
common to the other countries shown in the figure, indicating that the technical change was
pervasive.  The price pattern, however, is very different in the lower panel where land prices are
deflated by the consumer price index.  In this case, the graph presents the price in terms of the
consumer goods.  For the US the index of the consumption-based land price in 1993 stood at a
level of 0.833 as compared to a level of 0.727 in 1910, an increase of 15 percent over a period of
83 years.  By this measure, there was little difference in the welfare of land owners (or their
families) who kept the land for most of the whole century.  This is an indication that the benefits of
the technical change have been distributed to the economy at large and have not been retained in
agriculture.  Here again, the pattern is the same for the other countries in question, indicating that
the main shocks affecting agriculture, and leading to the decline in the real agriculture price, were
pervasive..  
Land prices, like agricultural prices, have undergone cyclical variations.  At its peak in
1980, the consumption-based US land price was twice as high as in 1910, or four times as high as
its trough value in 1942.  This highlights the sensitivity of this measure of agricultural welfare to
changes in the economic environment.  Another view of the same phenomena is obtained from a
comparison of the index of agricultural output and the agricultural GDP made by Gardner (2002,
Figure 8.1).  The output index measures changes in output in terms of agricultural prices, and thus
it is the analogue of the upper panel of Figure 4.  The second measure is GDP in 1992 dollars
obtained by applying the overall GDP deflator to the nominal agricultural GDP.  Because the GDP
deflator is close to the CPI, this measure is the analogue of the lower panel of Figure 4.  In 1910
the value of the real agricultural  GDP was 74 billion of 1992 dollars, and this was also the value
in 1996 (it was even lower in 1993).  For comparison, the output index increased from 26 in 1910
to 86 in 1996, more than a threefold rise.  It should be noted that the two measures differ not only
by the deflator but also in the coverage of the components included in each.  This difference in
coverage is, however, of secondary importance to that of the deflator. To sum up, the difference is
dramatic.
The big changes in agriculture where the labor force shrank drastically, the number of
farms declined, the lack of long term trend in the consumption-based land price, has had its impact34
on the income of those stayed in agriculture.  “USDA’s detailed economic surveys of individual
farms in the 1980s and 1990s indicate that about 40 percent of U.S. operate at a loss in any given
year.” (Gardner 2002, p.269).  The survival in the sector underlines the importance of the
idiosyncratic qualities for success.  
Conclusions
The development of US agriculture in the last two centuries had some of the more
important ingredients discussed in the growth literature.  Starting from a resource based growth
generated by the inflow of labor and capital from abroad, followed by the introduction of
mechanization leading to the reduction labor demand, and later on by the biological and chemical 
based growth.  Thus, land in farms grew by a factor of 4 between 1850 and 1950, the peak year for
land in farming.  Agricultural labor was initially increasing together with the land expansion, but
this came to an end.  Between 1900 and 1990 agricultural labor shrank nearly by a factor of 4. 
Thus, the output growth in the twentieth century cannot be attributed to labor.  During the period of
fast land expansion,  land played a major role in output growth, but this has changed from around
1940, when chemical, biological, and capital inputs were gaining importance.  Growth based on
land expansion is not a future option for most countries, but it has had its legacy in some thinking
about the pattern of development.  Future growth will be based on technical change, and growth in
the inputs needed to its implementation.
For this reason, we have concentrated on the role played by technical change.  The US long
experience, like that of other countries, is consistent with the fact that the implementation of new
technologies depends on the economic environment.  Because the available technology in
agriculture is largely a public domain, the variability in its implementation depends on the
incentives and constraints, and those vary over time and across countries.  This is reflected in the
country distribution of the productivity measures.  The decomposition of output growth to that of
TF and TFP is endogenous in the system, and the growth accounting exercise, therefore, is bound
to yield different results under different environments.  Is then the decomposition useful?  Yes,
very much so, because it tells us how the economic environment affects the growth process. 
Specifically, when changes in the available technology increase the demand for inputs the supply
of which is constrained, most of the technical change will be absorbed by a rise of the shadow
price of the restricted inputs, and this will increase the share of TF and reduce the share of the
TFP.  This is illustrated by the experience of Asian countries, (Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer,
2002).  With this insight, it is tempted to suggest that the US experience has benefited from a
relative smooth flow of resources between agriculture and nonagriculture.  Such a flow is essential35
for reaping the opportunities created by changes in the available technology.
There is a considerable literature documenting the extensive research and development
serving agriculture, and its positive impact.  Has there been enough research, or too much?  Direct
evaluation of returns to research suggest that the returns to research have been high (Evenson
2001).  The relation between research and productivity, however, is not direct, and its impact is
not immediate.  First, there is a time lag between the beginning of research, its intensity, and the
realization of positive results leading to a change of the available technology.  Second, having
reached  positive results, their implementation often requires resources.  The mobility of such
resources requires a supportive economic environment.  Thus the changes in productivity reflect,
in addition to changes in the available technology, also the prevailing economic environment.  For
this reason, inference from actual productivity changes on the research effort and its direction is
likely to yield distorted results.  This, for instance, applies to the view that Japan, with relatively
low land-labor ratio, has pursued land augmenting innovations, unlike the US where the
innovations were labor augmenting.  We have shown that in both countries the technical change
had labor augmenting bias, and was labor saving.  The reason that in both countries the bias is in
the same direction is that mechanization has been so productive that it has had a dominant effect on
the productivity changes everywhere.  This does not, however, rule out other forms of technical
change, and those were important and pervasive.
Another lesson is drawn from the changes in the average labor productivity.  Here the rate
in the US exceeds somewhat the median of the country distribution.  This is due to the changes in
output and in labor.  The agricultural labor force in the US declined relatively fast, reflecting the
rate of off-farm migration, and also the relatively low growth rate of the rural labor force.  The
rate of the off-farm migration has been affected favorably by the growth of the nonagricultural
sector.  It is expected that when such development will take place in other countries, agricultural
labor will decline, following the US trail.  This view asserts that the increase in the average labor
productivity reflects not only the labor demand in agriculture, but also the labor demand in
nonagriculture.  This poses another hurdle in inferring from changes in the labor productivity on
the nature of the intended research effort.
Because the implementation of changing available technology requires changes in resource
allocation in the economy, the ease of such changes is an important factor in the observed
productivity changes.  This is a general statement that covers the physical and institutional
infrastructure for flow of information and resource mobility, and lack of monopolistic bottlenecks
along the road.  It is suggested that the markets’ performance in the US have been relatively
conducive to the needed resource flow.36
Appendix
I.  Decomposition of inputs’ response to price and augmentation effects.  
The production function is  y / f(v1, ..., vJ), where f(.) is linear homogeneous in v.
The FOC for optimal allocation, conditional on y:  fj = pj, where pj is the price of a unit of vj,








































































































































Write the above as   [fij] [D(v)] [dln v] = [D(fj)] [dln fj], or  [D(fj]-1 [fij] [D(v)] [dln v] = [dln
fj].
 Decompose v to inputs in physical terms and the augmenting functions, vj = Ijxj, and similarly the
prices, pj = wj/Ij, where w is the normalized price of the physical input. The corresponding
vectors are :  [dln v] = [dln x] + [dln I], and   [dln f] =  [dln w] -  [dln I], Label   +- = [D(fj)]-1
[fij] [D(v)], then
+- (dln x + dln I) = [dln w - dln I], or
(+- + I) dln I = [dln w] - +- [dln x]
 +- is a generalized inverse of the matrix of factor demand elasticities, conditional on y, 
 
, and I is the identity matrix.  The result generalizes (4), (Mundlak e ¶ ¶ ij i j j ij i v p v f f = = ln / ln /
1968, p. 231).  The identification problem, stems from the fact that we observe only x and w, and
without knowing E, we cannot calculate the changes in I.  In the discussion, we have determined
the direction of the bias by placing boundaries on the elasticity of substitution.37
II  Differentiation of the condition on the extensive margin (equation 8):
Initially assume that w and c are deflated by H, and note that dx(z) vanishes by the envelope
theorem.  We thus write equation (8) as:
, then f x wx z c z or f f x ( ) ( ) / , (.) ( ) a a = + ”
f x z d x z dw cdz z dc z '(.) ( ) ( ) / / a = - +
2
Note that   and rearrange f w '(.) / = a
zwx z d zwx z dw w cdz z dc ( ) / ( ) / / a a = - +
cdz z zwx z dw w d dc / ( )[ / / ] = - + a a
Hence     In the text, we trace the impact of H explicitly. ¶ ¶ a ln / ln . z < 0
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TABLES
Table 1 US agriculture: growth rates (percent)
Variables Average productivity
1900-40 1940-90 1900-40 1940-90
Output 1 1.94
Land 0.59 -0.44 0.41 2.38
Fertilizers 2.66 3.27 -1.66 -1.33
Labor -0.42 -2.14 1.42 4.08
Capital 0.55 2.17 0.45 -0.23
Source: Capital and labor for 1900-1940, based on Tostlebe (1957, Tables 4 and 9).  The rest is based on Gardner
(2002): Output Figure 8.1, land Figure 1.1, fertilizers Figure 2.6a, labor Figures 8.1 and 8.2, Capital 1940-1990 Figure
8.4.
Table 2 US agriculture: decomposition of output growth
1900-1940 1940-1990
TF TFP TF TFP
weights 1 0.59 0.41 0.26 1.68








Table 3 US agriculture: growth rates of factor intensity (percent)
1900-1940 1940-1990
Capital-output  -0.45 0.23
Capital-labor  1.04 4.31
Capital-land  -0.04 2.61
Fertilizer-output 1.66 1.33
Fertilizer-land 2.07 3.71
Source: Based on Table 143
Table 4 Average growth rates (percent)
1800-1840 1840-1880 1880-1900 1800-1840 1840-1900
Agriculture Economy
Output 2.98 2.59 1.82 3.92 4.1
Labor  2.78 1.9 1.18 3.09 2.72
Capital 2.98 2.59 1.74 3.98 4.96
Land 2.8 2.17 2.17 2.8 2.17
TFP 0.59 0.74
Output/labor 0.2 0.69 0.64 0.83 1.38
Land/labor 0.02 0.27 0.99
Capital/labor 0.2 0.69 0.56 0.89 2.24
Capital/land 0.18 0.42 -0.43
Labor -total 3.1 2.78 2.6
Migration rate 0.32 0.88 1.42
Wage/land price -1.3a -2.19b 0
Notes: 
The source for the data in the Economy columns is Gallman (2000, p.15).
In the Agriculture columns, the variable labor-total represents the total labor force in the economy (Margo, 2000);
the other variables are for agriculture.  
Output/labor  ratio  -  Based  on  Weiss  (1993),  Table  4,  where  output  is  farm  gross  product,  including  farm
improvements (‘broad definition’).  
Labor - Based on Margo (2000) Tables 5.1 and 5.3.
Output - Computed from the growth rates of labor and of output-labor ratio.
Land - 1800-1840-1900 Gallman (2000), and Gardner, Figure 1.1.  The growth rate of land of 2.17 is the average for
the period 1840-1900.
Capital -  For the period 1840-1880 Gallman (1986, Table 4.8) reports the ratio of capital to value added in constant
prices.  The ratio was 2.67 in 1840 and 2.73 in 1880.  For lack of better information, we assume it to be constant,
and thus approximate the growth rate of capital to be the same as that of output.  In the same spirit, we apply the same
assumption to the period 1800-1840.  For later years, the source is Tostlebe (1957, Table 9) which  provides capital
values starting with 1870.  (Kendrick p.355, and Table B-III, modifies Tostlebe’s data, but the effect on the growth
rates is negligible for our discussion). The growth rate in 1880-1900 comes out close to that of the output growth.44
Note, however that the rate for 1870-1880 was 3.6.  Thus, the average rate for 1870-1990 is 2.35, which is in the
range of the values used. 
Migration rate is the difference between the growth rate of total and of agricultural labor.
Wage-land price ratio 1790-185 Christensen (1981, Table 1).  For 1850 on, Olmstead and Rhode (1993 Table 1).
a The number is for 1790-1850
b The number is for 1850-188045
Table 5 US agriculture: Growth rates, selected crops (percent)
1800-1840 1840-1880 1880-1900
Wheat
Output/labor 1.17 1.06 1.69
Land/ labor 1.17 1.39 1.43
Output/land 0 -0.36 0.37
Corn
Output/labor 0.55 1.06 1
land/ Labor 0.55 1 0.95
Output/land 0.1 0
Cotton
Output/labor 0.78 0.9 0.35
land/ Labor 0.78 0.31 0.3
Output/land 0 0.64 0.05
Source for crops:
Based on Rasmussen, Table 1.  The source for Rasmussen is M. R. Cooper, G. T. Barton, and A. P. Brodell, Progress
of Farm, Mechanization, U. S. Agricultural Department, Misc. Pub., No. 630.  Washington D. C.: Govt. Printing
Office, 1947.  Land: 1800-1840-1900 Gallman (2000).
Notes: The units are: Labor-land in terms of hours of labor per acre; output-land in terms of bushels of wheat and corn
per acre, and pounds of cotton per acre; labor-output in terms of labor hours per 100 bushels of wheat and corn, and
hours per bale of cotton.
The rate of growth of labor-output ratio should be the difference between the rates of growth of labor -land and
output-land rates.  The discrepancies are due to rounding errors.
The years are defined in the source as ‘about 1800', ‘about 1840', etc.46
Table 6  US agriculture: Average growth rates of selected variables (percent)
1910-40 1940-50 1950-90 1940-90
Real ag wages -0.32 5.45 1.43 2.22
Real land price -2.07 1.78 1.61 1.65
wages/land price 1.75 3.67 -0.18 0.57
Farm land 0.61 0.89 -0.59 -0.3
Ag labor -0.77 -2.5 -2.03 -2.14
land/labor 1.38 3.39 1.44 1.84
Critical F 0.79 0.94 1 1
Source:   Agricultural wages, Gardner (2002, Figure 4.4a).  The wages are deflated by the GDP deflator.
 Real land prices Mundlak, Larson, and Crego (1997).  The prices are deflated by the CPI.
Farm land , Gardner (Op. Cit )
Agricultural labor, 1900-1940 Tostlebe (1957, Table 4), 1940 on, Gardner Figures 8.1 and 8.2.
Critical F - positive values of F below the critical value are consistent with labor augmenting technical change.47







TFP 0.19 0.56 0.15 0.19 0.56 0.19
Labor AT  0.37 1 0.76 0.86 1.92 1.13
Land AT  0.015 0.11 -0.47 0.48 -0.81 -0.85
Wheat
TFP 0.58 0.4 1.08 0.58 0.4 1.08
Labor AT  1.48 1.54 1.99 2.4 2.9 2.51
Land AT  -0.31 -0.75 0.19 -1.2 -2.1 -0.34
Corn
TFP 0.27 0.6 0.47 0.27 0.6 0.47
Labor AT  0.78 1.5 1.07 1.47 2.7 1.42
Land AT  -0.23 -0.3 -0.12 -0.92 -1.5 -0.47
Cotton
TFP 0.39 0.79 0.2 0.39 0.79 0.2
Labor AT  1.04 1.26 0.39 1.82 2.2 0.5
Land AT  -0.26 0.32 0.01 -1.04 -0.61 -0.01
Notes:  F is the elasticity of substitution, IL and IK are the labor and land augmenting terms.  The calculations of the
TFP are based on the values in Table 4, equations (2) and (4), and on the assumption of equal weights for land and
labor.  Following the discussion, we use for the growth rates of the rent-wage ratio of 1.3 for the first period, 2.19
percent for the second period and 0 for the third period.
  48
Table  8    Margins’ response to the economic environment
Intensive (x) Extensive (z)
Labor augmenting bias (") negative for , > -1 negative
Neutral TC (I) positive negative
Product price (p) positive negative
wage rate (w) negative positive
land charge (c) no effect positive
Table 9  Critical value of the elasticity of substitution - US and Japan
Growth rates 1880-1930 1930-1970 1880-1930 1930-1970
Japan United States
Output 1.62 1.64 1.03 1.72
Land  0.47 -0.08 0.87 0.28
Labor -0.18 -1.48 -0.08 -3.27
Output/land 1.15 1.73 0.16 1.43
Output/labor 1.79 3.13 1.1 4.99
Land/labor  0.64 1.38 0.94 3.5
Wage/land price -0.89 1.97 0.9 0.16
Critical F 1 0.7 1 1
Source: Ruttan and Binswanger (1978, Tables 3-1 and 3-2).  Except for the last raw, the entries are average annual
growth rates in percent.
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